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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN L. MATTINGLY and the
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of
Social Services,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

Case No.

14627

vs.
THOMAS C. MATTINGLY,
Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The issues are procedural question^.

Specifically, the

basic issue is whether or not it is appropriate to take depositions in actions to recover child support arrearages without
first obtaining an order to show cause.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lowei court, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft presiding,
entered an order on the 4th day of June, 1976, decreeing:
1.

That the State of Utah's intervention in the above

entitled matter is proper based on the fact that the expenditure of welfare funds makes the State of Utah a proper party to
the action.
2.

That the signing of a divorce decree makes the action

final,and the intervention of the State of Utah does not give
rise to a cause of action upon which a deposition may be taken.
3.

That the State of Utah cannot take a deposition re-

garding child support payment after the signing of a divorce

decree without an order to show cause pending in the
matter.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have provisions #2 and #3 of Judge
Bryant Croft's order of June 4, 197 6, reversed and an order
entered requiring the defendant to appear, pursuant to the
subpoena, that issued for the purpose of taking his deposition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Mattingly was formerly married to the plaintiff.
Children resulted from this union, prior to their divorce.
A child support order was entered pursuant to the divorce
decree, but the defendant fell in arrearage on his payments.
Subsequently, the plaintiff was required to go on state welfare to support her children.

The State of Utah brought an

action, pursuant to statute, to be joined as a party and to
take defendant's deposition to ascertain what the circumstances
were concerning the support arrearages.
On May 25, 197G, counsel for plaintiffs and defendant
appeared before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge in the
Third Judicial District for Salt Lake County.

Defendant's

counsel was in court objecting to the state's interpleader
action and notice of taking deposition.
the State of Utah was a proper party.

The judge found that

However, the judge

found that once a final divorce decree is signed, the case
is closed; and, therefore, no action concerning the taking
of depositions could occur until there was an order to show
-2-

cause.

From this decision, the plaintiffs-appellants

appeal,
POINT I
THE SIGNING OF A DIVORCE DECREE IN UTAH IS FINAL ONLY
INSOFAR AS THE RIGHTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, BUT THE DECREE I
NEVER FINAL AS TO THE SUPPORT RIGHTS OF THE CHILDREN.
While a divorce decree is final as to the litigants, i
is well established law in Utah that divorce decrees are
never final in respect to child support rights.

This prin-

ciple has been codified in state law, ahd this high court
has consistently held the same:
Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A. (1953)
Disposition of property and children—
When a decree of divorce is made, %he court
may make such orders in relation tct> the
children, property and parties, anq. the
maintenance of the parties and children, as
may be equitable. The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent
charges or new orders with respect to the
support and maintenance of the parties, the
custody of the children and their support and
maintenance, or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary.
/Emphasis added_/7
/I,27 From the language of the statute,
and as stated numerous times by the decisions
of this court, these propositions $re firmly
established: (1) that such proceedings are
equitable;1 and (2) that under the authority
conferred "to make subsequent changes or new
orders with respect to * * * the custody of the
children and their support and maintenance * * *"
the court retains jurisdiction to deal with such
matters in supplemental proceeding^ with the samp
authority and in the same manner afe it could
deal with them originally.^ /Emphasis added^7
Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P.2d 231, 232, 26 U. 2d 436.
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From this language, it is clear that a court in Utah
has full authority to deal with continuing child support
matters in the same manner as it could deal with them originally, even after the divorce decree is final.

This is because

the divorce decree is really a separate entity, altogether
different from the issue of child support, and the two are
related tangentially at best.

Thus, while the divorce de-

cree is a final judgment between the litigants, i.e., the
parents, the issue of child support is a separate and distinct issue between the minor children and their father.

It

is, therefore, incongruous for a trial court to assume that
the final divorce decree has any finality as to its effect
on the child support issue.

As quoted from Harmon, supra:

"The court retains jurisdiction to deal with such matters
/child support and maintenance/ i n supplemental proceedings
with the same authority and in the same manner as it could
deal with them originally."
Other Utah cases supporting this basic position include:
Rees v. Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 864, 311 P.2d 788; Bott v. Bott,
20 U.2d 329, 437 P.?d 684; Harrison v. Harrison, 22 U.2d 180,
450 P.2d 456; Ridinn v. Riding, 329 P.2d 878, 8 Utah 2d 136.
POINT II
THE ISSUANCE OF A SUBPOENA TO COMPEL ATTENDANCE FOR
DEPOSITION PROCEEDINGS, WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING AN ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE, IS APPROPRIATE IN DIVORCE CASES WHERE ARREARAGES
IN SUPPORT PAYMENTS EXIST.
-4-

Authorized by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45-(1-9),
the State of Utah has the authority to collect support funds
in the manner of reimbursement for public funds expended in
the support of children and neglected families.

The receiv-

ing of public assistance aid establishes the need of the
welfare recipient as well as bringing into play the authoritative, collateral position of the Stat^ of Utah in collecting
child support payments.
As was established in point #1, supra, the cases are
numerous holding that divorce decrees are never final insofar
as child custody and support matters, fiy definition, they are
modifiable and if they are modifiable it is proper to allow
the free use of depositions to help establish financial status*
The requirement of first obtaining an order to show cause
prior to talcing such depositions is an unwarranted burden,
Utah Coclo Annotated, 30-3-1, states as follows:
Proceedings in divorce shall be commenced
and conducted in the manner provided by law for
proceedings in civil causes.
Since divorce proceedings and continuing support requirements are civil in nature, it only follows that Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rules 26-37, regarding depositions and discovery, may properly be used in arrearage matters following a
divorce decree.

Until the point of time when final judgment

is entered, discovery by deposition under Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rules 26-30, is available to help establish what
has or what has not been paid.

And since divorce decrees

are never final as to child support, the free use of
-5-

depositions to determine a father's financial status, even
after the divorce decree, is entirely proper.

Thus, the

Rules of Civil Procedure apply to child support as being a
continuing aspect of the original divorce proceedings.
Many states recognize that pretrial disclosure might
destroy any chance of reconciliation of the parties, but once
the decree has been signed, this concern goes to the welfare
of the children and not to hopes of reconciliation.

This

court cogently explained this basic principle and its relationship to divorce decrees, continuing child support, et
al., in Harmon v. Harmon, supra.
In order to carry out the important responsibility of safeguarding the interests and welfare
of children, it has always been deemed that the
courts have broad equitable powers. To accept the
plaintiff's contention that an adjudged arrearage
is tantamount to a judgment in law, would in the
long run tend to impair rather than to enhance the
abilities of both the plaintiff and the court to
accomplish the desired objective. Such a judgment
at law does not have the valuable and useful attribute which allows its enforcement by contempt measures. For the foregoing reasons decrees and orders
in divorce proceedings are of a different and higher
character than judgments in suits at law; and by their
nature are better suited to the purpose of protecting
the interests and welfare of children.^5
In carrying out that objective there are a
number of factors to be taken into consideration.
These include not only the enforcement of the payment of support money which becomes due, but perhaps more important, the conserving of the prospects
for its continuance^ At p. 23 2, 233. /Emphasis
addedTT
This language indicates the rather unique character of
divorce decrees and child support.

It further points out the

fallacious reasoning of the district court in assuming that a
-6-

final divorce decree has the same effect as other final
judgments, insofar as discovery is concerned.
There is nothing in the common law or the laws of the
State of Utah that indicates that the free use of depositions
in matters of arrearages is not a legitimate modern discovery
tool.

Rule 30(a) states as follows:

When Depositions May Be Taken. After
commencement of the action, any party may
take the testimony of any person, including
a party, by deposition upon oral examination.
/Emphasis added_/7
This rule makes no mention of, nor limits the situation or
type of case in which the deposition may be taken.

In parti-

cular, it has no requirement of obtaining an order to show
cause before a deposition can be taken.
Furthermore, U.C.A., Section 30-3-5, supra, makes clear
that matters of arrearage in child support are actually part
of the original divorce action; and, thus, despite the final
divorce decree, should still be subject to the same discovery
procedures as any other matter in the original action.

And,

since an order to show cause is normall^ not required to take
a deposition in civil cases, there is no justifiable reason
to require such an order in arrearage matters.
Corpus Juris Secundum states the following concerning
the scope of examination for which deposlitions can be used in
divorce actions:
Scope of examination. In the taking of
a deposition all matters may be inquired into
which may be presented as evidence at the trial;
considerable liberality should be allowed in the
cross-examination of a witness . . .
27 C.J.S.,
Divorce, Section 145.

This gives broad license for,the use of depositions,
going so far as saying "all matters."

Surely, "all matters"

can reasonably be construed to include arrearages. And, in
particular, such depositions should be allowed without the
added burden of first obtaining an order to show cause.
Even in older cases, where discovery techniques were
limited, the courts allowed the use of depositions for determining the financial status of the husband after a decree
of divorce had been entered.

In Scheffer v. Scheffer, 48

N.Y.S.2d 839, 183 Misc. 344, a wife was bringing a contempt
action against her former husband for failure to pay alimony.
The wife was seeking to take her former husband's deposition,
to determine his financial status in an attempt to collect
arrearages.

The court said:

. . . Examinations before trial as to
a husband's financial ability have been denied
in matrimonial actions upon the theory that in
advance of the establishment of the right to a
separation or a divorce, the plaintiff should
not be permitted to examine the defendant as to
his financial affairs. Here, however, the right
to a divorce has been established by a final
judgment of divorce, and it is necessary for the
plaintiff to obtain information concerning the
earnings and financial condition of the defendant in order to properly present her case to the
official referje. Otherwise, the reference
might prove abortive, and of little value; at
best, a wife generally has little knowledge of
the financial condition of a husband from whom
she has been separated or divorced." Page 840.
/Emphasis added^7
Thus, as this New York court held, there must be some
tool available to parties to establish what the situation is
relative to child support payments.

It seems incongruous to

say that once the decree is signed, the parties cannot freely
-8-

use discovery to establish whether modifications should be
made or to find out why child support payments are not current.

Such should be permitted to allo^ the fair and equit-

able procedures in such matters as divorce which in every way
seem to require concern when the welfar^ of children are at
stake and indeed provide an inexpensive method of insuring
accuracy and compliance with such matters.

The purpose of the

recovery program of the State of Utah is to conserve tax dollars.

It seems antithetical to that purpose, as well as to

general public policy, to require the state to seek an order
to show cause before depositions can be taken in arrearage
recovery cases.

Such a requirement cannot be supported

legally; and, in terms of time and public expense, it cannot
be justified.
CONCLUSION
Because divorce decrees are never final, insofar as
child support, is concerned, the court continues to retain
the same jurisdiction on arrearage matters as it had in the
original divorce proceedings.
It follows, therefore, that the Ut^h Rules of Civil
Procedure apply to arrearage matters following a divorce
decree.

Since it is the policy of the court to encourage

free discovery, it is neither legally sound nor economically
feasible, in terms of both time and money, to require a
party to obtain an order to show cause before taking a deposition in an arrearage matter.

Legally, there should be

no distinction between the use of depositions prior to or
-9-

subsequent to a divorce decree, at least insofar as child
support matters are concerned.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Utah Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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